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 Abstract 
This study investigates characteristics of Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) 
participants who join the association due to its Pareto superior allocation in Ghana. Some 
scholars like Dejene and Van den Brink have hypothesized that people join ROSCAs because 
of its Pareto superior allocation. The study employed primary data analysis in achieving its 
main objective.  Out of the 400 ROSCA participants sampled for the study from Asunafo North 
Municipality of Ghana, 71.75% joined the association because of its Pareto superior allocation. 
A Probit model was used to predict the probability of joining the association due to its superior 
allocation. The dependent variable took the value of one when respondents join the association 
due to its superior allocation and zero if otherwise. Married participants, participants with no 
or low level of education, participants who are unemployed and participants who save more of 
their income are more likely to join ROSCA due to its Pareto superior allocation. It was 
recommended that that ROSCA participants who have access (participants living in urban 
sectors) to formal financial institutions, participants who have accounts at formal financial 
institutions, participants who are rich and aged participants should be educated on how ROSCA 
constitutes its Pareto superior allocation 
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 1. Introduction 
 Informal financial sectors dominate in developing countries than formal financial sectors 
(Aryeetey & Hyuha, 1990). Formal financial sectors consist of categories of stocks containing 
firms that offer financial services to commercial and retail customers. Examples include banks, 
investment fund, insurance companies and real estate. Informal financial sectors, on the other 
hand, consist of those, often unrecorded, activities that take place outside official financial 
institutions. It must be noted that these sectors are legal but unregulated. Among money-
lending, Susu collection, Accumulated savings and credit associations (ASCRAs) etc., rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are one of the major informal financial sectors one 
can think of. A more general definition of ROSCA was given by Shirley Ardener as "an 
association formed upon a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a 
fund which is given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in a rotation" (Ardener, 1964).  
2. Background of the study 
 The root of Rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) was traced by Geertz (1962) 
from the regions of West Africa countries that were economically developed during the slave 
trade era into the Caribbean and the southern part of the United States. According to Ardener, 
ROSCA operated in Japan as far back as the thirteenth century (1275 AD). Handa and Kirton 
(1999) on the other hand reported that ROSCAs in Jamaica also called ‘Jamaica partner' rooted 
from the slaves from Africa who used it as a device to purchase their freedom. Poole and Grant 
(2006) indicated that, during the slave trade era, slaves from West Africa were found using a 
type of financial savings mechanism called Susu, which is a form of Rotating savings and credit 
association (ROSCA). 
The term rotating savings and credit association was coined by Geertz (Geertz, 1962). 
According to him, earlier scholars have used many terms to describe the association. Among 
which include, contribution clubs, slates, mutual lending societies, pooling clubs, thrift groups, 
and friendly societies. ROSCA is the most dominant form of informal financial institution in 
most developing economies (Besley et al., 1993). It is called Susu in Ghana, esusu in Liberia 
and Nigeria, osusu in Gambia, asusu in Sierra Leone, and ndjonu in Benin, arisan in Indonesia, 
yao hui in China, tontine in Cameroon and Senegal, equbs in Ethiopia, huis in Vietnam, and 
finally, keh in Korea   (Bouman, 1995).   
There is a slight distinction between the general term Susu and ROSCA as used in Ghana. Susu 
is a term used for informal financial activities such as Susu collection scheme, ROSCAs, 
ASCRAs etc. Susu is one of the oldest traditional way of banking in Ghana. The term Susu in 
the Akan language means “small small”. This indicates savings made on daily, weekly or 
monthly basis by those economically active poor people. Particularly Susu collection scheme 
is a form of “small small” saving up whereby a person decides to contribute on daily basis to 
another person (the Susu collector) for an agreed period of time usually a month. Here the 
collector is remunerated with a fee. ROSCA, on the other hand, is a form or a subset of the 
general term “Susu” used in Ghana.  
ROSCAs are found almost in every part of the world, but research shows that they are highly 
dominated in the rural areas of developing economies where citizens do not have enough access 
to formal financial institutions such as Banks (Besley et al., 1990).  Besley et al. (1990) 
proposed that the main aim of these institutions is to save up for the purpose of buying durable 
indivisible goods such as bicycles or to provide financial support to major events such as 
weddings. 
Basically, there are two forms of ROSCAs. These are the random ROSCAs and the bidding 
ROSCAs. Besley et al. (1990), defined random ROSCAs by saying that "In a random ROSCA, 
members commit to putting a fixed sum of money into a ‘pot' for each period of the life of the 
ROSCA. Lots are being drawn and the pot is randomly allocated to one member in the group. 
In the next period, the process repeats itself, except the previous winner is excluded from the 
draw for the pot. The process continues, with every past winner excluded, until each member 
of the ROSCA has received the pot once. At this point, the ROSCA is either disbanded or 
begins again  Besley et al. (1990)". They went ahead and defined bidding ROSCA as one that 
allocates the pot by using bidding procedures. Thus the participant who obtains the pot in the 
current period does so by bidding higher. For instance, pledging higher future contributions to 
the ROSCA or one-time payment to the other members. 
The most common form of ROSCA in Ghana is the random ROSCA. ROSCAs are the source 
of fund and capital formation for most of the small-scale enterprises and especially market 
women and petty traders in Ghana. It can play an active role in the development of the Ghanaian 
economy if the government gives the necessary avenue for the operation of the sector (Owusu 
et al, 2013). ‘This is because the Ghanaian economy is highly dominated by small and medium 
scale enterprises and therefore can develop the economy through import substitution 
industrialization strategies’ (Owusu et al. 2013). According to  Aryeetey and Steel (1995), 
rotating savings and credit associations are mostly practiced by petty traders. “Many traders 
and market women in Ghana use ROSCAs to expand their businesses” (Aryeetey & Gockel, 
1991). Also, some office workers in the urban areas of Ghana have developed an interest in 
ROSCA participation. 
SMEs ability to access funding within the formal sectors in Ghana has become a challenge. 
The challenge affects the smooth running of businesses in the SMEs. The challenge stems from 
the fact that access to services of formal financial institutions requires documented rules such 
as valid collateral security, residential documents etc. For instance, many formal financial 
institutions require that any of its clients who come for a loan must have a collateral security, 
which ensures excludability of these petty traders from the operations of formal financial 
services. 
 Although there has been an introduction of savings and loans companies and microfinance 
companies, these companies fail to deliver effectively in an attempt of helping these petty 
traders. Some of the factors that cause their breakdown in their attempt of delivery, especially 
microfinance institutions include the high rate of interest on their investment packages which 
eventually collapse the institutions. Owners are being forced to escape with the available fund 
in their coffers and also overtrading by the microfinance institutions collapse the microfinance 
institutions (Antwi, 2015). As an alternative, rotating savings and credit associations has 
become an instrument for these SMEs in raising funds to support their operations.  
According to the round six of the Ghana living standards survey (GLSS6) main report, the 
proportion of urban households which save through Susu (which is a form of ROSCA, Poole 
and Grant (2006)) in Ghana are 54.91% with Accra having only 9.1% and 45.8% goes to the 
other urban centres in Ghana. 45.1% of those in the rural areas save through Susu. Those in the 
rural coastal constitute 4.2%, whereas 30.9% of people in rural forest saves through Susu and 
finally, 10.0% of people in rural Savannah save through Susu. This gives clear evidence that 
people in urban areas are more likely to save through Susu (ROSCA included) in Ghana. In 
Accra, 3.8% had their loans from Susu and 23.4% in other urban centres had their loans from 
Susu. In rural coastal, 23.4% had their loans from Susu whereas 10.4% of the rural forest had 
their loan from Susu and finally, 14.7% of the rural savannah had their loan from Susu. With 
regards to sex, 4.5% of males obtain their loans from Susu and 11.3% of females obtain their 
loan from Susu. 
Let's take for instance a group of five school teachers who have agreed to enter into a ROSCA, 
with the aim of buying bicycles to help them reduce their lateness to school. The cost of their 
choices of the bicycle is Five Hundred Ghana Cedis. Let's assume further that, the monthly 
salary of each teacher is one hundred Ghana cedis. So, it means for a teacher to own a bicycle, 
it will take him/her five months of saving his/her salary(saving alone), deposit his/her monthly 
income at a bank against an interest and going for an interest-bearing loan from a bank. But if 
they enter into a ROSCA, all the teachers except the last person on the rank would receive their 
bicycle before the end of the fifth month. At least four of these teachers will prefer ROSCA to 
the other forms of financial intermediation except the last person who will be indifferent 
between saving alone and joining the ROSCA. Also with reference to the formal 
intermediation, they will prefer ROSCA since it does not come with any interest on credit. 
In the above example, it can be seen clearly that ROSCA enables each of its members to acquire 
his/her indivisible good (bicycle) within the shortest possible time. Besley et al., (1990) 
postulated that ROSCA sequentially gives solutions to the lumpy problems of each individual 
in the association. It also shortens the time period each individual would wait in case they were 
to save alone, except the last person on the rotation. Since all the ROSCA participants with the 
exception of the last person on the rank are liable in receiving the pot sooner, the average cost 
of ROSCA fund may be competitive even for people who have access to credit from formal 
financial institutions (Brink & Chavas, 1991). Hence all these participants will be strictly better 
off for being a member of the association with the exception of the last person, who will be 
indifferent between joining the association and saving alone. Hence ROSCA constitutes a 
Pareto superior allocation (Besley et al., 1990). 
If we take a critical look at the ROSCA carefully, we realize that all the ROSCA participants 
(with the exception of the last one on the rotation) obtain advance money that they will repay 
through their contributions during the circle. The first person to receive the contributions (rank 
one in the order of rotation) receives the maximum credit that he/she pays back in the 
subsequent contributions. The last person in the other of rotation receives no credit and saves 
throughout the circle.  
The basic principle of ROSCA is the same on every continent. “It exists in at least three 
continents (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and within very different communities” ( 
Bouman, 1977).  Despite the manifest importance of ROSCA, there has been little literature on 
ROSCA in the economics field. Reason being that the importance of such institution is not well 
understood. Microeconomist sees ROSCA as an informal credit market that is not competitive. 
On the other hand, among macroeconomists, they are sometimes assumed to be perfectly 
competitive. Also since the entire institution is governed by mutual trust, in a situation where 
a member is not so credit-worthy, his/her participation is discouraged. Again, “arrangement 
used by associations that have bearing on defaults is a provision by which members can 
contribute less to the fund of members they consider to be relatively poor risks”(Miracle et al., 
1980). 
There is a hypothesis that ROSCA as an institution gives Pareto superior allocation in a society 
where there exist fragmentation in the capital market (Dejene, 1993).  The superiority comes 
in as the waiting time to buy durable indivisible good reduces. So many people will join the 
association because of its Pareto superior allocation. This thesis develops a new argument on 
the characteristics of ROSCAs participants who join the association due to its Pareto superior 
allocation. 
3. Theoretical underpinnings on ROSCAs 
 Contending Hypothesis about the Motives for joining ROSCA. 
Dejene (1993) hypothesized that ROSCA as an institution gives Pareto superior allocation in a 
society where there is fragmentation in the capital market. The superiority comes in as the 
waiting time to buy an indivisible good reduces. Anderson et al., (2009) used the term ‘early 
pot motive’ as the motive for joining ROSCA for the early purchase of indivisible goods. 
Theoretically, models that explain the great abundance of rotating savings and credit 
associations were developed by Besley, Coate, and Loury (1992, 1993). These economists 
demonstrated that participation in ROSCA was not efficient as compare to saving alone and a 
random ROSCA gives the individual a higher ex-ante expected utility than formal financial 
sectors. What this means is that the association gives each of its participants except the last 
person on the rotation, the pot for the purpose of their participation sooner than they would 
save alone. However, some participants enjoy their purpose periods after, before others. And 
almost all the participants with the exception of the last one on the random rotation enjoy it 
earlier than they would have saved. These participants would be strictly better off with the 
association and hence the association becomes inefficient. 
 Besley et al. (1993) presented an economic framework for the analysis of ROSCA, which has 
become the required recommendation for economic analysis of ROSCA. This model developed 
by  Besley et al. (1993) explain individuals’ decision to participate in the ROSCA and provide 
guidelines for choosing the duration and type of ROSCA. In the model developed by Besley et 
al., series of assumptions were made which include ROSCA members being risk averse, having 
identical preferences, perfect and complete information about the type of the other bidders. In 
addition, the size of the pool is assumed constant throughout the ROSCA and members are 
excluded from obtaining credit from other sources. In the setup of Besley et al., the pool of the 
ROSCA is equal to the price of an unspecified durable good and nondurables are assumed to 
be complementary. 
While arguing against the early pot motive, Gugerty (2007) argued that if the main motive for 
joining the ROSCA is due to its superior, then the last person on the rotation will not be better 
off by joining the association. He will leave the association. The second last person who now 
becomes the last person will decide the same and also leave the association since him/her will 
not be better off in joining the association. In his study, Gugerty (2007) shows ROSCA is for 
the purpose of buying divisible goods rather than indivisible goods. 
Net Present Value Analysis and ROSCA Participation 
Brink and Chavas (1991) used net present benefit analysis in choosing between ROSCA and 
saving against an interest and going for an interest-bearing loan from a formal financial 
institution. Their illustrations are as follows: 
Let’s assume we have M individuals who wish to obtain an indivisible good A. The options 
open to them include joining a ROSCA group, borrowing an interest-bearing loan from the 
bank and saving alone (Autarky). In the ROSCA, M will be equivalent to the number of periods 
in the rotation and also the number of individuals in the rotation. We assume further that the 
indivisible good (B) yields benefit (b) in every period once it has been obtained by each 
individual (j). Therefore the net benefit of the ROSCA in period t for individual j will be given 
by: 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 {=𝑤−𝑐+𝑏    𝑡≤𝑗=𝑤−𝑐           𝑡˂𝑗 
Where c is the contribution one makes to the ROSCA whereas w is the overall income one 
obtain in each period. We will assume zero discount rate. 
The benefit to the first individual (J=1) will be obtained by adding: ∑ 𝑌1𝑡𝑀𝑡=1 = ∑ (𝑤 − 𝑐 + 𝑏)𝑀𝑡=1  
M (w-c + b) = M (w-c) + Mb. 
The last person on the rotation only benefits from b in the last period. Therefore the total benefit 
of the last person on the circle is given by: 
∑ 𝑌𝑀1=𝑀𝑡=1 M (w – c) + b 
If j is the individual's rank in the rotation such that, 1 ≤ J ≤ M, Then generalizing net benefit of 
an individual with rank J is given by: 
M (w – c) + (M- J +1) b. 
Now, the per-capita benefit one will obtain from the ROSCA will be given by: 
1𝑀 ∑ 𝑀 (𝑤 − 𝑐) + (𝑀 − 𝐽 + 1)𝑏𝑀𝑗=1  
Which will reduce to Mw – B + (𝑀+1)2  𝑏 
Since ∑ 𝐽𝑀𝑗=1  = 𝑀 (𝑀+1)2   and c = 𝐵𝑀 
Now let’s consider saving against an interest being an alternative to ROSCA. Interest is 
assumed to be paid each period (that is no compound interest) so the total benefit of such 
savings for an individual j will be given by: 
M (w – c) + ∑ 𝑗𝑟𝑐𝑀𝑗=1  =M (w – c) + 𝑀 (𝑀+1)2 rc 
Where r is the interest rate and c is the amount each individual saves at a particular point in 
time. 
The individual will prefer ROSCA to saving with an interest when  
M (w-c) + ( 𝑀+1)2 𝑏 > M (w – c) + 𝑀 (𝑀+1)2 rc        but c=𝐵𝑀 
That is 
b > rB   
Thus the benefit an individual in the ROSCA group obtain periodically after the indivisible 
good is attained needs to be sufficiently higher in relation to the interest on savings. If b > rB, 
it will imply that there are positive returns in joining the ROSCA. Thus ROSCA will be 
considered as Pareto superior to saving with the bank against interest.    
Let's assume the next alternative of borrowing against an interest rate from the bank. So here 
the total repayment amount equals B + i (M-1) B. where i is the interest rate on credit. So the 
net benefit of an individual who goes in for such a loan will be M (w + b) – B- i (m-1) B. An 
average individual will prefer the ROSCA to the contracting of loan when; 
M (w – c) +(𝑀+1)2 𝑏 > M (w + b) – B-i (M -1) B 
Given B = Mc, reduces to the following condition: 
b<2iB 
 Thus ROSCA will be preferred to borrowing against an interest if and only if the benefit 
obtained from acquiring the good is less than 2ib or the individual will go in for the loan if 
otherwise. 
In conclusion, we have established that an average individual in the ROSCA will choose 
ROSCA due to its profitability when the benefit he/she obtains after owning the indivisible 
good lies between rB and 2iB. That is, rB< b < 2iB. 
Transaction Cost Theory and ROSCA Participation  
Adam Smith, in the classical school of thought, explained specialization, to be the determinant 
of the productivity level in an economy. Specialization, on the other hand, can be realized when 
there is an exchange which involves its own expense – a transaction cost (Coase, 1998). There 
is an inverse relationship between transaction cost and specialization or division of labour 
alongside productivity in an economy. Transaction cost depends positively on the existing 
institutions which include the legal, political, education and social system. 
According to the neoclassical economists, the efficient market works only when transaction 
costs are zero. Whenever there are transaction costs, then institution matters. This confirms the 
reason for the argument by New Institutional Economists (NIE) that institution matters in the 
world where much of the national income goes into transaction cost. 
The formation of the institution is underpinned by the transaction cost which in turn is 
dependent on the level of information completeness and the capacity of human beings to 
undergo the information processing. According to North (1995:2), “the cost of transaction 
arises because information is costly and asymmetrically held by the parties to exchange. The 
way of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the goods or services exchanged or of 
the performance of agents and the cost of enforcing agreement determines transaction cost”. 
Hence institutions are built to reduce the level of uncertainty in an exchange. 
The individuals and the institution as a whole with a bargaining power as a result of the 
institutional framework have a crucial responsibility in perpetuating the system. According to 
game theory, the probability of obtaining a cooperative solution will be high when there is a 
repetition of the game many times. This gives complete information about the performance of 
each player. If the game is not repeated by the players, then the gain from cooperation will be 
outweighed by the gain from defection. Hence it is the repetitive nature of ROSCA that renders 
its default rate to be low as well as its exchange cost (Gugerty, 2007). 
Institutions are made up “formal rules, informal norms, and the enforcement of characteristics 
of both” (North 1995). And the combination of these three determines the performance of the 
economy. Sandsør (2010) states that low transaction cost, including low traveling cost and 
distance as well as low bureaucratic cost, are the basic characteristics of ROSCA. According 
to Geertz (1962) ROSCAs are institutions that show the transformation of a society from 
agrarian to commercial. 
 Besley et al. (1993) in their seminal contribution developed a ROSCA theory by saying that, 
there is an inverse relationship between the size of ROSCA contribution and the size of 
ROSCA.  Thus when the size of ROSCA is large (a lot of members in the association), the size 
of ROSCA contribution is small (members contribute small amount) and the opposite is also 
true. 
Other Theories of ROSCAs 
According to  Besley et al. (1992) individuals who participate in ROSCA are credit constraint. 
Thus people who join ROSCA are mostly people who do not have access to the formal credit 
market. This may be as a result of lack of collateral security or inadequate availability of formal 
financial sectors. 
   Ardener (1995) argues that where incomes are very low, where there is no formal social 
security network, where ill health stalks and a variety of calamities, however, a system of low 
cost, ROSCA helps to meet the challenges for all. She also believed that ROSCAs are informal 
finance mechanism that is predominantly used by the poor.  
Handa and Kirton (1999) disputed the fact that ROSCA participants are credit constrained as 
proposed by Besley et al. In trying to explain why wealthier individuals are members of 
ROSCA, they observed individuals who are unlikely to be credit constrained in the formal 
financial market and found out that, these individuals also part-take in ROSCA. Moreover, lack 
of assets for collateral is given as a reason why people should choose an informal finance 
mechanism (such as the ROSCA) over a formal financial institution. 
A theory that has also gone through viral empirical studies is the theory that, women are more 
likely to participate in ROSCA than men. 
  At a theoretical level, Anderson and Baland (2002), rely on an intra-household conflict in 
consumption decision and of the existence of asymmetric preferences for household goods 
between men and women.  
A theory regarding the link between ROSCA participation and durable goods acquisition was 
developed by Besley et al (1993, 1994), they confirmed that, in a world where a number of 
individuals have an aim of acquiring an indivisible durable consumable good and has no access 
to external help or formal financial intermediation, ROSCA provide a good means of realising 
gains from inter-temporal trade. 
Gugerty (2007) postulated that what lures an individual in joining a ROSCA is the ability to 
save in an effective way rather than impatience. "Savings require self-discipline and ROSCA 
provides a collective mechanism for individual self-control in the presence of time-inconsistent 
preference and in the absence of alternative commitment technologies" 
Kedir et al. (2011) on theoretical grounds postulated that savings and deposits from an interest 
paying oriented bank provide a relatively lower yield, but a relative safer instrument of 
investment for poor people. On the other hand, random ROSCA is quiet riskier. The basic form 
of its riskiness is its lottery nature of given out pots to the lucky participants. Since no rate of 
interest is attached to savings associated with ROSCA, a late receipt of pot implies a loss of 
guaranteed interest income that a bank deposit would have granted. Also given borrowing 
constraint, an early ROSCA pay-out gives a major source of finance to a lumpy investment of 
capital goods, notwithstanding consumer durables. Thus ROSCA participation is riskier but 
gives higher yield, whereas investment in bank deposits is safe but its yields are lower. 
 Adams and de Sahonero (1989), Handa and Kirton (1999) made a theoretical postulation that, 
married women of middle age who have acquired at least basic education are more likely to be 
ROSCA participants. 
Anderson and Baland (2002), Rutherford (2000), Vetrivel and Chandrakumaramangalam 
(2010) hypothesized that credit-constrained individuals are banned from the credit market 
because they lack a minimum starting budget. On the same line,  Besley et al. (1993), Levenson 
and Besley (1996), hypothesized that poor people are banned from formal credit market since 
they don't have collateral security to start with. So they should be motivated to participate in 
ROSCA than wealthier people. 
Recent studies by Kimuyu (1999) and Varadharajan (2004) suggest that the very poor people 
are less motivated to participate in ROSCA because they lack minimum starting budget. 
4. Some empirical studies 
Sandsør (2010) conducted empirical studies using data from Kibera slum. Among the 16 and 
older individuals in 511 households, resulting 1270 observations, the percentage of the groups 
that have registered were reported to be only 10%. This means that majority of the ROSCA 
groups operate under illegal sense. About 98% of the leaders of the association were elected 
and most of the association (about 91%) meets on a regular basis. 74% had penalties associated 
with not attending meetings. It was also reported that the probability of a ROSCA participant 
being a couple is high. And participants are also less likely to have completed primary school. 
Furthermore, it was reported that there exists a higher probability that a ROSCA participant is 
having a job. 
According to Vradharajan (2004) Whiles married individuals are more likely to participate in 
arisan. Highly educated individuals, on the other hand, had a significant and positive 
correlation with the arisan participation as compared to individuals with no education. In 
conclusion, he found that in Indonesia ROSCA are not necessarily meant for poor people, 
rather the rich have a higher probability of participating in ROSCA. 
Handa and Kirton (1999) conducted an econometric research on the economics of rotating 
savings and credit associations, where they took their evidence from Jamaica. They concluded 
that bankers of ROSCA in Jamaica are old, rich and have enough experience on the smooth 
running of the association. And payment to these bankers has a significant relation with the 
sustainability of the partner. Their analysis supported the theory that was postulated by T. 
Besley et al. (1993) that, there exists an inverse relationship between the size of the ROSCA 
and the periodic contribution of the association. 71% of their sample reported using their 
ROSCA winnings for the purchase of consumer durables. A significant proportion (14%) 
reported using their pot for precautionary savings for unplanned expenses. 
According to Dagnelie and Lemay‐Boucher (2012), empirical analysis by Handa and Kirton 
(1999) and Brink and Chavas (1991) agree with their evidence collected from a sample of 496 
households in Cotonou, Benin that: ROSCA participants are mainly poor individuals who do 
not have enough access to formal institutions. Finally, they drew a conclusion that women are 
less likely to be a member of ROSCA than men in Cotonou: while men constitute 51% of all 
adult population, women being the minority constitute 45% of all ROSCA members. The 
likelihood for a woman to participate in ROSCA in Cotonou is 15%, this increases to 21% 
when she is married and 22% if she works (24% if she does both). Men have an overall 
probability of 19% of participating in ROSCA, 32% when they live as couples and 31% if 
working (35% if both). Their analysis also disagrees with the fact that, ROSCA participants 
are mainly women. 18% of all ROSCA surveyed were exclusively made up of women, whereas 
26% were made up of men. And the remaining of the groups was made up of both men and 
women with 63% having a majority of male members. 
 
 
5. Methodology 
Data Source 
Primary data was used for the study. The data was obtained from administering questionnaires 
to respondents and conducting interviews. The questionnaire was administered to ROSCA 
participants, whereas in some cases, interviews were conducted.  
Target Population 
The population of interest in relation to the primary data comprises of the total number of 
people living in the Asunafo North Municipality. According to population and housing census, 
the total population of the municipality is about 124,685. The population consist of people 
living in the areas of Goaso, Mim, Akrodie, Fawohyeden, Ayomso and their remote villages. 
Sample Size  
The sample of the study was based on the residents of the municipality who were participants 
of ROSCAs. And the sample size was based on the formula 
n=
𝑁 1 + N (𝛼)2 
Where,  
n₌ sample size 
N₌ Population        
 α₌ 95% confidence interval. 
n=
1246851+124685(0.05)2 
   =398.72 
This is approximately 400 
Sample Methods 
Both purposive and convenient sampling techniques were used in the study since the research 
was being constrained with time and resources. Purposive sampling technique is a non-random 
sampling technique which was used to select ROSCA participants for the study whereas the 
convenient sampling technique was also used to select respondents who were ready and in the 
position to respond to the questionnaire. With regards to the purposive and convenient 
sampling technique, the questionnaire was administered approximately for a period of 3 weeks 
to participants of ROSCA.  
Data Collection Instruments 
The instruments that were used in the primary data collection were questionnaires. Primarily, 
collection of data for the study was through administered questionnaire to ROSCA participants. 
But due to factors such as high illiteracy rate and the research being constrained with time, 
interviews and observations were somehow used at some point in time. The questionnaires 
administered were both open and closed ended questions. With the data collection, the 
researcher started from Goaso (the Municipal capital) to Akrodie, Fawohyeden, Ayomso and 
finally to Mim.  
The questionnaire was made up three sections, the first section considers the basic 
characteristics of the individual participant. The second section considers the savings behaviour 
of the individual participants. And the final section considers the other questions which include 
the expenditure behaviour of the participants. 
The questions comprise of both structured and unstructured questions. The structured questions 
were straight forward with plausible answers in which respondents were asked to choose from 
and also dichotomous questions with two answers, yes or No. On the other hand, unstructured 
questions were used to acknowledge the genuine opinions of respondents on certain issues. 
The Primary Data Estimation 
The researcher employed a binary Probit model in the analysis. The dependent variable (Y) 
was obtained when respondents were asked “why did you join the association?” the dependent 
variable (Y) took the value of one (1) if an individual participant joined the association because 
it shortens the time period he/she could have wait in case he was to save alone thereby making 
him/her better-off and zero if otherwise. The model specification is given by 
Pr (Y= 1) = Ø (𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑠𝑒𝑥+𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_ + 𝛽4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐_𝑙𝑒𝑣 +𝛽5 𝑒𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 +𝛽6𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒+ 𝛽7𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝑠 + 𝛽8 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 +𝛽9𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 +𝛽10𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 )…………………………………. (2) 
 
Where, 
 Ø is the commutative distribution function for the standard normal. 
 Sex is a dummy variable which represents either the person is a male or female (sex 
equals one if the participant is a female and zero if otherwise). 
 Age is the age of individual participants. 
 Marital_ is a dummy variable which represents the marital status of the participant 
(marital_ equals to one if the individual participant is married and zero if otherwise). 
 Educ_lev is a dummy variable which represents the educational level of individual 
participants (educ_lev equals one if individual participants’ level of education is low 
or if participants have no formal education and zero if otherwise). 
 Emp_stat is a dummy variable which represents the employment status of individual 
participant (emp_stat equals one if the individual participant is unemployed and zero 
if otherwise). 
 Income represents the income status of the participants. 
 Amount_s represents the amount saved out of income. 
 Access is a dummy variable which represents individual’s access to the formal 
financial institution. 
 Account is a dummy variable which represents whether the individual participant has 
an account with a formal financial institution or not (account equals one if the 
individual has an account with a formal financial institution and zero if otherwise). 
 Valuable is a dummy which represents whether the individual has a valuable asset or 
not. This is also to tell us if the participant is rich or poor. Those with valuable assets 
were regarded as rich since assets measure permanent income and those without 
valuable assets were regarded as being poor. (Valuable equals one if respondents has 
valuable assets and zero if otherwise).  
6. Findings and Discussions 
A probit model which is similar to what Varadharajan (2004) used in his analysis of ROSCA. 
The dependent variable took the value of one (1) if respondents join the association due to its 
Pareto superior allocation and zero if otherwise. 
Table 5.1 probit regression 
Why ROSC                     Coef                                            std. Err                                p˃z 
Age                              0.0131938                                 0.0270168                             0.625 
Sex                               -0.343009                                  0.6285642                            0.956 
Marital_                       2.929124                                   0.8540669                             0.001                                                
Educ_lev                     5.003173                                    1.049289                             0.000 
Emp_stat                     3.641996                                     0.9019385                          0.000 
Income                       -0.002045                                    0.0006618                            0.002 
Amount_s                   0.010330                                     0.0026165                            0.000 
Access                        0.294524                                      0.6356313                            0.643 
Account                     -0.419420                                     0.5876568                           0.475 
Valuable                    -0.631783                                      0.5160093                           0.221 
_cons                         -11.4809                                        2.887353                             0.000 
 
 
Source: field survey 
 
Table 5.2 Marginal Effect from the Probit Estimates 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y1 
  
Age 0.000396 
 (0.000808) 
Sex -0.00102 
 (0.0189) 
marital_ 0.0878*** 
 (0.0219) 
educ_lev 0.150*** 
 (0.0169) 
emp_stat  0.109*** 
 (0.0192) 
Income -6.13e-05*** 
 (1.71e-05) 
amount_s 0.000310*** 
 (6.05e-05) 
Access 0.00883 
 (0.0190) 
Account -0.0126 
 (0.0175) 
Valuable -0.0189 
 (0.0149) 
  
Observations 400 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                     Source: Field survey, 2017 
 
 
Table 5.2 above shows the results of the Probit model. The Probit model was used to analyse 
why respondents participate in ROSCA. The dependent variable took the value of one if 
respondents join the association because it shortens the time period they would have wait in 
case they were to save alone thereby making each of them better off with the exception of the 
last one in the rotation who will be indifferent and zero if otherwise.  
Participants’ access to formal financial institutions was used as a measure of whether the 
participant lives in a rural area or an urban area in the municipality. Those who had access to 
formal financial institutions were classified as living in the urban areas in the municipality and 
those who don’t have access to formal financial institutions were classified as participants who 
live in the rural areas of the municipality. Again, participants were asked whether they have 
valuable assets or not. Since assets measure one’s permanent income level, respondents who 
answered yes were regarded as not being poor and those who answered no were regarded as 
being poor. With educational level, respondents were asked what their highest level of 
education was. Those with secondary/vocational, HND/diploma, university, and professional 
qualification were classified as highly educated participants and those with no education and 
primary/JHS/middle were regarded as no or low level of education. 
Age, sex, whether participants have valuable assets and whether participants have accounts 
with formal financial institutions were not statistically significant, however, marital status, 
educational level, employment status, income levels, the amount saved out of income were 
statistically significant. 
Marital status, educational level, employment status, the amount saved out of income have a 
positive influence on the probability of predicting the superiority of ROSCA as a determinant 
of ROSCA participation. Income, on the other hand, has a negative influence in predicting 
Pareto superiority of ROSCA as a determinant of ROSCA participation. The Pseudo 𝑅2 of 
0.9093 implies that about 90.93% of the variation in the decision to join ROSCA because of 
its Pareto superior allocation is jointly explained by the explanatory variables. 
Marital status is significant at 1% and it indicates that, when ROSCA participant is married, 
the probability that he/she joins ROSCA due to the fact that the association shortens the time 
period he/she could have wait in case they were to save alone thereby making each of them 
better off with the exception of the last one in the rotation who will be indifferent is explained 
by marital status. The marginal effect of marital status indicates that 1% increase in participants 
who are married will increase the probability of joining ROSCA due to its Pareto superior 
allocation by 8.78%.  
Educational level is also significant at 1% and it indicates that, ROSCA participants who have 
no or low level of education are more likely to join the association due to its Pareto superior 
allocation. The marginal effect of educational level on the other hand indicates that 1% increase 
in ROSCA participants who have acquire low or no level of formal education will increase the 
probability of joining ROSCA due to its Pareto superior allocation by 15%. 
Employment status and amount saved out of participants’ income are all significant at 1%. The 
marginal effect of employment status and amount saved out of participants’ income indicates 
that when ROSCA participant is unemployed and the amount he/she saves out of his/her 
income increases by 1%, the probability that he/she joins ROSCA due to its superior allocation 
will increase by 10.9% and 0.031% respectively. 
Finally, incomes of ROSCA participants are also significant at 1% and have a negative 
influence on predicting the superiority of ROSCA as a determinant of ROSCA participation. 
The marginal effect of income indicates that a unit increase in ROSCA participant’s income 
will decrease the decrease the probability of joining ROSCA due to its superior allocation by 
3.72. 
Sex, age, whether individual participants have account with formal financial institutions or not, 
whether participants have valuable assets or not (rich or poor) and the probability that they join 
the association due to the fact that it shortens the time period they would have to wait in case 
they were to save alone, thereby making all of them better off with the exception of the last 
person on the rotation are independent. Thus whether the individual participant is a child, youth 
or aged doesn’t predict his/her vulnerability of joining the association because it gives Pareto 
superior allocation. Again, either the individual is a male or female doesn't predict his 
vulnerability of joining the association because it gives Pareto superior allocation. Finally, 
living in the rural or urban area and being rich or poor doesn't predict your vulnerability of 
joining the association due to its Pareto superior allocation. 
 
 
Qualitative analysis of ROSCA participants 
One of the qualitative analysis was based on why people join ROSCA. Respondents were 
given options to choose from which include; because it shortens the time period they would 
wait in case they were to save alone, because there is no formal financial in their community, 
because it serves as insurance, because they don’t have collateral to secure loan from formal 
financial institution and others. 
 
Table 5.3 Reasons Why Respondants Join ROSCA 
Variable Frequency  Percentage 
Why did you join the Association 
Because it shortens the 
time period I would wait 
in case I was to save alone 
287 71.75 
Because there is no 
formal financial 
institution in my 
community 
41 10.25 
Because anytime I am in 
need and it’s not even my 
turn in the rotation, I can 
be given the pot 
54 13.50 
Because I don’t have 
collateral to secure loan 
from the formal financial 
institution 
16 4 
Others 2 0.50 
Total 400 100 
   
Source: field survey 2017 
In Table 5.3 above, respondents were asked: “Why did you join the association”. The options 
open to them were, because it shorten the time period the respondent would wait in case he/she 
was to save alone, because there is no formal financial institution in respondent’s community, 
because anytime they are in need and it’s not even their turn in the rotation they can be given 
the pot, because they do not have collateral security to secure loan from the formal financial 
institutions. Finally, respondents who did not see any of the reasons to be their prime reason 
for joining the association were to select the “others” and indicate their main reason if others. 
Out of the 400 respondents interviewed 71.75% (n=287) joined the association because it 
shortens the time period they would wait in case they were to save alone. 10.25% (n=41) joined 
the association because they do not have any formal financial institutions in their community. 
Also, 54 respondents representing 13.50% joined the association because anytime they are in 
need and it’s not even their turn in the rotation, they can be given the pot. Sixteen (16) 
participants representing 4% joined because they don’t have collateral security to secure a loan 
from the formal financial institution, with two (2) participants having other reasons apart from 
the four reasons. 
 
Characteristics of ROSCA participants 
In achieving one of the specific objectives, the characteristics of ROSCA participants were 
reviewed.  
Table 5.4 Characteristics of ROSCA Participants 
Variables Frequency  Percentage 
Sex of respondents 
Male 107 26.75 
Female 293 73.25 
TOTAL 400 100 
Marital status of respondents 
Married 301 75.25 
Single 86 21.5 
Divorce 8 2 
Widow 5 1.25 
TOTAL 400 100 
Highest level of education of respondents 
Highly education 86 21.5 
Low or no level of 
education 
314 78.5 
TOTAL 400 100 
Employment status of respondents 
Employed 65 16.25 
Unemployed 335 83.75 
TOTAL 400 100 
Criterion for allocating the pot 
Balloting 281 70.25 
Lottery 117 29.25 
Bidding 2 0.5 
TOTAL 400 100 
How often respondents meet 
Weekly 309 77.25 
Monthly 91 22.75 
TOTAL 400 100 
Respondents access to formal financial institution 
Yes 269 67.25 
No 131 32.75 
TOTAL 400 100 
Do you have valuable assets 
Yes 173 42.25 
No 227 56.75 
TOTAL 400 100 
Do you receive financial assistance elsewhere 
Yes 233 58.25 
No 167 41.75 
TOTAL 400 100 
Relationship with the person 
Husband 124 53.22 
Wife 10 4.29 
Friend 22 9.44 
Relative 77 33.05 
TOTAL 233 100 
Do you have account with formal financial institution 
Yes 215 53.75 
No 185 46.25 
TOTAL 400 100 
Can there be change of order in time of need 
Yes 386 96.5 
No 14 3.5 
TOTAL 400 100 
Change of order of rotation after each round 
Yes 343 85.75 
No 57 14.25 
TOTAL 400 100 
Registration of the Association 
Yes 77 19.25 
No 323 80.75 
TOTAL 400 100 
Are there any written rules governing your association 
Yes 250 62.5 
No 150 37.5 
TOTAL 400 100 
Are there any penalties associated with not attending ROSCA meeting 
Yes 388 97 
No 12 3 
TOTAL 400 100 
Source: field survey 2017 
It can be discerned from 5.4 that, females constitute a greater portion of ROSCA participation. 
The results demonstrate that majority of the respondents 73.25% (n=293) are females whilst 
26.75% (n=107) are males. This indicates that indeed females are more likely to participate in 
ROSCA than males. This confirms the assertion made by Gugerty (2007) and Varadharajan 
(2004) that females are more likely to participate in ROSCA than males and disagrees with the 
assertion by Dagnelie and Lemay (2012) that, males are more likely to participate in ROSCA 
than females. 
In Table 5.4 above also gives the marital status of the 400 ROSCA participants interviewed. 
The majority of the participants are married. The percentage of participants who are married 
constituted 75.25% (n=301), those who are single constitute 21.5% (n=86) whilst 2% (n=8) 
and 1.25% (n=5) goes for divorce and widowed respectively. This confirms the findings by 
Varadharajan (2004) and Sandsør (2010) that married individuals are more likely to participate 
in ROSCA. 
 Respondents were asked what their highest level of education was. It can be ascended in Table 
5.4 that, those with no level of education and primary/middle/JHS were regarded as having low 
or no level of education. On the other hand, participants with secondary/vocational, 
HND/diploma, university and professional education were regarded as being highly educated. 
From the table, those with no or low level of education constitute the majority 78.5% (n=314) 
of ROSCA participation whilst those with high level constituted 21.5% (n=86). This confirms 
the conclusion made by Sandsør (2010) that, ROSCA participants are less likely to acquire 
higher education. However, it disagrees with the findings by Lasagni and Lollo (2011) that 
ROSCA participants are highly educated.  
Table 5.4 above also shows the employment status of the ROSCA participants. Participants 
who are unemployed constitute the greater proportion of ROSCA participation. Out of 400 
ROSCA participants, 83.75% (n=335) are unemployed and do not receive any fixed amount of 
salary every month. But they are into farming, learning a trade, petty trading, and store keeping. 
However, those who had white colour jobs constituted 16.25% (n=65). 
Table 5.4 above also depicts the criterion used in the disbursement of ROSCA funds to its 
members.70.25% (n=281) indicated that the criterion for their disbursement of fund to its 
members is through balloting, whilst 29.25 (n=117) indicated that they used lottery as their 
major criterion for disbursement. 0.5% (n=2) indicated they use bidding as their criterion for 
disbursement of the fund.  Based on the available data, it was found out that most of the rotating 
savings and credit associations’ use balloting as their main criterion of disbursement of the 
fund as claimed by Owusu et al. (2013). 
 Respondents were asked how often they carried out their ROSCA meetings. The closed-ended 
options included daily, weekly, bi-weekly and monthly. It can be ascended from Table 5.9 that, 
out of the 400 respondents, 77.25% (n=309) indicated that their ROSCA meetings are carried 
out on weekly basis whilst 22.75% (n=91) indicated that their meetings are carried out on 
monthly basis. No respondent indicated their meetings to be daily and bi-weekly. This is to 
conclude that most of the rotating savings and credit associations meet on weekly basis to 
contribute to the pot. 
Table 5.4 also shows individual participants access to formal financial institutions. Those who 
have access to these institutions were classified as participants who live in the urban centres of 
the municipality and those without access were classified as those who live in the rural areas 
of the municipality. From the table, it can be seen that out of the 400 ROSCA participants, 
67.25% (n=269) lived in the urban areas of the municipality whilst 32.75% (n=131) lived in 
the rural areas of the municipality. This gives an indication that people living in urban areas 
are also more likely to participate in ROSCA as indicated in the GLSS 6 report. It also confirms 
the assertion by Lasagni and Lollo (2011) that, ROSCA participation in urban villages are 
higher than ROSCA participation in rural villages and also confirms the postulation by Handa 
and Kirton (1999) that, ROSCA participants are not credit constrained as postulated by Besley 
et al.,(1993,1994).  
Table 5.4 above also depicts the results when ROSCA participants were asked whether they 
have valuable assets. Assets as a measure of permanent income were used to measure the 
wealth of the participants. Those who answered yes are classified as not being poor and those 
who answered no are classified as being poor. Poor participants constitute the majority 56.75% 
(n=227) whilst rich participants constitute 43.25% (n=173). This confirms the assertion by 
Dagnelie and Lemay (2012), and Varadharajan (2004)  that, poor people are more likely to 
participate in ROSCA.  
In Table 5.4, out the 400 ROSCA participants interviewed, the majority 58.25% (n=233) 
receive financial assistance elsewhere. Whilst 41.75% (n=167) receive no financial assistance 
from anybody. This is to say that, people who participate in ROSCA receive extra financial 
support from other sources.    
Table 5.4 above also shows the relationship that exists between the 233 ROSCA participants 
who receives financial assistance elsewhere. Greater proportion 53.22% (n=124) receive the 
financial assistance from their husbands, 33.05% (n=77) receive their financial support from 
their close relatives whilst 4.29% (n=10) and 9.44% (n=22) receive their financial supports 
from wife and friends respectively. This confirms the assertion by Gugerty (2007) that, married 
women are more likely to participate in ROSCA.  
Table 5.4 again demonstrates that a greater proportion of the ROSCA participants have an 
account with formal financial institutions. Out the 400 participants interviewed, 53.75% 
(n=215) have an account with formal financial institutions, whilst 46.25% (n=185) do not have 
an account with any formal financial institutions. This is an indication that most of the people 
who have an account with formal financial institutions are also ROSCA participants. This 
confirms the claim by Handa and Kirton (1999) that ROSCA participants are not credit 
constrained. 
In Table 5.4, 96.5% (n=368) answered yes to the question, "in the case of need, can a participant 
change his/her order of rotation". Whilst the remaining 3.5% (n=14) answered no. This 
supports the insurance motive of joining ROSCA postulated by  Besley et al. (1992) and 
confirms the conclusion by Sandsør (2010) that, ROSCA helps in pooling resources to help 
participants who are in need. 
Respondents were also asked whether their association changes the order of rotation after each 
round. Table 5.4 also shows clearly the response of the respondents. Out of the 400 ROSCA 
participants, 85.75% (n=343) of the people answered yes whilst the remaining 14.25% (n=57) 
answered no. This is an indication that most of the ROSCA groups reverse their order of 
rotation after each round. This confirms the assertion by Sandsør (2010) that most of the 
ROSCA groups change their order of rotation after each round of the life of the association. 
It can be observed from Table 5.4 that, out of the 400 respondent interviewed, 80.75% (n=323) 
ROSCA participants reported that their association is not registered, whilst 19.25% (n=77) also 
reported that their association has been registered. This means that majority of the ROSCA 
groups operate in the illegal sense as concluded by Sandsør (2010). 
Respondents were asked whether they have written rules governing the association. Table 5.9 
depicts the response of respondents. Out of the overall ROSCA participants, 62.5% (n=250) 
answered yes, whilst 62.5% (n=150) responded no. This is an indication that, most ROSCA 
groups have written rules governing their association.  
According to Table 5.4, out of the 400 ROSCA participants, 97% (n=388) answered yes to the 
question "Are there any penalties associated with not attending meetings", whilst 3% (n=12) 
answered no. this gives an indication that most of the ROSCA groups have penalties associated 
with not attending meetings which confirm the findings by Sandsør (2010). 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 From the field survey analysis, the majority of ROSCA participants join the association 
because the association shortens the time period they would wait in case they were to save 
alone. It is recommended that ROSCA participants who have access to formal financial 
institutions (participants living in urban centres), participants who have accounts at formal 
financial institutions, participants who are rich and aged participants should be educated on 
how ROSCA constitutes its Pareto superior allocation. 
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